SE-201-2020: Security architecture for sensor systems
Grid operators depend on grid information for effective and efficient operation, maintenance, and planning. This information is traditionally collected by the SCADA system through remote terminal units (RTUs) or gateways placed at substations.
But in this way grid operators are only monitoring part of the grid. For many use cases, information cannot be collected in the traditional way. Examples are oil quality monitoring in the transformers, hot spot temperature monitoring in transformers and lines, copper theft detection and fault passage indication in overhead lines. Sensors collecting information for these cases can often not easily be connected to substation RTUs or gateways, because they are physically too far, or it is too costly to logically integrate them into the systems.
New sensors, often based on internet-of-thing (IoT) technologies, are used to fill this gap. These sensors allow grid operators to get more data about the grid, at a lower cost.
But because of the goal of low cost, it is often not clear what security requirements can be set for the sensor systems. To keep the cost of sensors down, they have less computing power than RTUs or gateways. To reduce installation cost, the sensors are sometimes battery powered. So, some measures may not be feasible on the sensors. Also, to minimize the cost of installation and maintenance, security configuration and key management should take as little time as possible from engineers. So, these functions should be automated where possible.
This document provides a recommended security architecture for sensor system, particularly those based on IoT technologies. It gives a set of technical measures that those designing and maintaining the systems can use to mitigate security risks by reducing the likelihoods.
SE-301-2020: Security requirements for procuring sensors
This document gives security requirements that grid operators can use directly in their procurement documents for new sensors, in particular sensors based on internet-of-things (IoT) technologies.
Grid operators depend on grid information for effective and efficient operation, maintenance and planning. This information is traditionally collected by the SCADA system through remote terminal units (RTUs) or gateways placed at substations.
But in this way grid operators are only monitoring part of the grid. For many use cases, information cannot be collected in the traditional way. Examples are oil quality monitoring in the transformers, hot spot temperature monitoring in transformers and lines, copper theft detection, and fault passage indication in overhead lines. Sensors collecting information for these cases can often not easily be connected to substation RTUs or gateways, because they are physically too far, or it is too costly to logically integrate them into the systems.
New sensors, often based on IoT technologies, are used to fill this gap. These sensors allow grid operators to get more data about the grid, at a lower cost.
But because of the goal of low cost, it is often not clear what security requirements can be set for the sensor systems. To keep the cost of sensors down, they have less computing power than RTUs or gateways. To reduce installation cost, the sensors are sometimes battery powered. So, some measures may not be feasible on the sensors. Also, to minimize the cost of installation and maintenance, security configuration and key management should take as little time as possible from engineers. So, these functions should be automated where possible.
This document provides a harmonized set of security requirements that grid operators use directly in their procurement documents for sensors. The requirements have been reviewed by both grid operators and sensor vendors. They are designed to fit into existing processes and procedures.
WP-030-2020: Distribution automation RTU hardware security test report
This test report gives the results of testing a distribution automation remote terminal unit (RTU) against the hardware security requirements that ENCS has developes in its member project on hardware security. See:
- WP-021-2020: Security requirements for hardware security measures
- WP-023-2020: Protecting distribution automation systems against physical attacks
The report gives a good overview of how the requirements can be tested, what vulnerabilities are typically found when RTU vendors first implement them, and how these vulnerabilities can be mitigated.
The test report is classified as TLP:AMBER. It is only shared with employees at ENCS members that need to know its contents for their work on distribution automation security.
To request a copy of the report, please contact info@encs.eu
SC-301-2020: Security requirements for procuring SCADA applications
This document gives security requirements that grid operators can use directly in their procurement documents for SCADA application software.
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system is the core of a grid operation infrastructure for both transmission system operators (TSOs) and distribution system operator (DSOs). The SCADA system is critical to the business continuity of grid operators.
At the same time, the SCADA system’s core position also makes it attractive to anyone trying to sabotage the electricity grid. Through the SCADA system, they can control thousands of field devices. So, SCADA systems should be strongly secured.
But securing these systems is becoming more difficult as they are becoming more connected. The time that SCADA systems were stand-alone, air-gapped systems has long passed. Most grid operators have now connected them to their enterprise IT systems to export data for grid planning and to import geographic information. The vendor of the SCADA system often has remote access for maintenance. Control center of other grid operators are connected. Field equipment from distributed energy resources (DER) or customer feeding in gas are being connected. And field engineers are getting remote access to get a better view of the system and give feedback about executing switching actions. Each connection creates a possibility for attackers to get into the SCADA system.
This document provides a harmonized set of security requirements that grid operators can use directly in their procurement documents. The requirements have been thoroughly reviewed by both grid operators and SCADA vendors. They are designed to fit into the processes and procedures already in place in the organizations, and to find a good balance between security and operational impact.
EV-401-2020: Security test plan for EV charging stations (2017 requirements)
This document provides a plan to electric vehicle (EV) charging stations against the EV Charging System Security Requirements, version 1.01 of August 2017, developed by ElaadNL and ENCS.
When the requirements are used, the need arises to evaluate the charging station against the requirements. Most procurement processes include acceptance testing to make sure that the selected charging station does indeed meet all requirements. This document provides a standardized test plan to evaluate the charging stations against the security requirements developed by ElaadNL and ENCS in 2017.
By standardizing the test plan, the test results can be shared between charge point operators. The vendor of the charging station can order a security test according to the test plan. If the charging station passes the tests, the vendor can use the test report to show compliance in all tenders that use the security requirements. This is expected to reduce the cost of testing and can give charge point operators assurance in advance that there are charging stations meeting the requirements.
If the vendor’s equipment provides additional security features, then this plan can be extended to include specific testing steps for the corresponding requirements.
The test plan consists of three phases:
- Functional tests and a vulnerability assessment by the vendor, usually performed during development;
- A review of development processes and security design and OCPP security conformance testing by an external lab;
- A penetration test by an external lab.
SC-201-2020: Security architecture for SCADA systems
This document provides are recommended security architecture for SCADA systems. The document is a draft shared with ENCS members for review.
The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system is the core of a grid operation infrastructure for both transmission system operators (TSOs) and distribution system operator (DSOs). The SCADA system is critical to the business continuity of grid operators.
The core position of SCADA system also makes them attractive to anyone trying to sabotage the electricity grid. Through the SCADA system, they can control thousands of field devices. So, SCADA systems should be strongly secured.
But securing these systems is becoming more difficult as they are becoming more connected. The time that SCADA systems were stand-alone, air-gapped systems is long past. Most grid operators have now connected them to their enterprise IT systems to export data for grid planning and import geographic information. The vendor of the SCADA system often has remote access for maintenance. Control center of other grid operators are connected. Field equipment from distributed energy resources (DER) or customer feeding in gas are being connected. And field engineers are getting remote access to get a better view of the system and give feedback about executing switching actions.
Each connection creates a possibility for attackers to get into the SCADA system. This document describes a security architecture for SCADA systems to mitigate these risks. It specifies the technical security measures grid operators can implement to secure the SCADA system.
EV-101-2019: Security risk assessment for EV charging infrastructure
Assessment of the security risks for a typical EV charging infrastructure.
As part of the energy transition, there has been a large growth of electric vehicles on the streets. By June 2018, already one million electric cars were registered in Europe and almost a quarter of cars is expected to be electric in 2030.
The electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure is being expanded to keep up with this growth. Millions of charging stations will be placed throughout Europe. Many will be remotely controlled by Charge Point Operators (CPO).
These charging stations need to be protected against cyber-attacks. The electrical load that is controlled remotely by the CPOs, will soon be large enough to affect the stability of the European grid. If the power on a high number of charging stations would be switched off at the same time, this could lead to significant power outages.
ENCS has developed a security architecture for the EV charging infrastructure. The goal of this risk assessment is to show how the measures in this architecture sufficiently mitigate the security risks.
EV-401-2019: Security test plan for EV charging stations
Plan to test an EV charging station against the ElaadNL and ENCS security requirements.
ElaadNL and ENCS have developed a set of security requirements for procuring electric vehicle (EV) charging stations . The requirements are based on a risk assessment and a security architecture for the whole EV charging infrastructure. The security requirements can be used directly in the procurement process.
This document provides a standardized test plan to evaluate the charging stations against the security requirements. By standardizing the test plan, the test results can be shared between charge point operators. The vendor of the charging station can order a security test according to the test plan. If the charging station passes the tests, the vendor can use the test report to show compliance in all tenders that use the security requirements. This reduces the cost of testing and can give charge point operators assurance in advance that there are charging stations meeting the requirements.
The test plan consists of three phases:
- Functional tests and a vulnerability assessment by the vendor, usually performed during development;
- A review of development processes and security design and OCPP security conformance testing by an external lab;
- A penetration test by an external lab.
EV-390-2019: Market survey for electric vehicle charging
Results of a market survey on the security of electric vehicle charging stations held in November 2019.
ENCS has produced a set of security requirements that charge point operators can use for procuring secure charging stations. To verify that these requirements are feasible in the current market, ENCS has conducted a survey among charging stations vendors, asking if they can implement the most advanced requirements.
DA-401-2019: Security test plan for distribution automation RTUs
Plan to test an distribution automation RTU against the ENCS security requirements.
ENCS has developed a set of security requirement for procuring distribution automation (DA) remote terminal units (RTUs). When the requirements are used, the need arises to evaluate the RTU against the requirements. This document provides a standardized test plan to do this.
By standardizing the test plan, the test results can be more easily shared between grid operators. The vendor of the RTU can perform security tests according to the test plan and then use the test report to show compliance in all tenders that use the security requirements. This reduces the cost of testing and can give grid operators assurance in advance that there are RTUs meeting the requirements.
The test plan consists of three phases:
- Functional tests and a vulnerability assessment by the vendor, usually performed during development;
- A review of development processes and security design by the grid operator, usually performed during selection;
- A penetration test by an external lab, usually performed after the RTU has been selected.